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Introduction
In October 2015, around 30 scholars convened at the
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(MPIDR) in Rostock to discuss: (a) how individuals
and families make decisions about marriage, child-
birth, migration, retirement, and other transitions in
the life course; and (b) how these decision processes
can be operationalized in demographic models. The
workshop was organized by the Scientific Panel on
Microsimulation and Agent-Based Modelling con-
vened by the International Union for the Scientific
Study of Population (IUSSP) and by MPIDR. The
report of this ‘Science of choice’ workshop and the
papers presented are available from the workshop’s
website (see IUSSP 2015). The five papers included
in this Supplement are revised versions of papers pre-
sented at the workshop in Rostock.
Populations change because people change. The
explanation of population change requires a deeper
understanding of why people change their behaviour
and what causes these changes. These causal factors
(e.g., motives) and causal mechanisms (e.g.,
decision-making processes) cannot be studied at the
population level, because they operate at the individ-
ual (micro) level, with consequences felt at the popu-
lation (macro) level (see, e.g., Billari 2015). This
generative explanation, which states that patterns
and dynamics at the macro level are generated by
actions and interactions at the micro level, has
become a dominant paradigm across the sciences.
As noted by Courgeau et al. (2017), the ‘downward’
feedback effects, from the macro to the micro, imply
that the macro-level patterns cannot simply be
obtained by aggregation of micro-level behaviour.
This necessitates the joint modelling of different
levels affecting the phenomenon of interest. Early
examples of the generative explanation include
Schelling (1978) and Boudon (1979). In the social
sciences, this approach is also known as mechanism-
based explanation (see Hedström and Ylikoski 2010
for an overview and de Bruijn 1999 for an early
application of mechanism-based explanation in
demography, starting from Coleman 1990). Agent-
based models (ABMs) and microsimulation can be
used to gain insight into behavioural mechanisms
and the transmission mechanisms that connect the
micro and the macro.
In population studies, agent-based modelling was
initiated in 2001, at a workshop at the MPIDR in
Rostock (Billari and Prskawetz 2003), followed by
workshops at the Vienna Institute for Demography
in 2003 (Billari et al. 2006) and the University of
Leuven in 2014 (Grow and Van Bavel 2017). The
‘Science of choice’ workshop in 2015 zoomed in on
one of the core issues in agent-based modelling:
namely, the theory and modelling of decision-
making processes and the behaviours that follow.
A transition in the life course usually involves mul-
tiple choices at several levels (see also Hobcraft
2006). Some choices are related directly to the tran-
sition, while others are associated with intermediate
factors and risk factors that condition, facilitate, or
inhibit the transition. For instance, marriage is the
outcome of a complex process involving partner
search and matching, with choices along the way. It
is common practice in demography to focus on
events and to explain and predict events by relating
their occurrence and timing to personal character-
istics and contextual factors. The focus on events
and the explanation by association have proven
together to be a successful strategy for most of the
time. But individuals and families with similar
characteristics and in similar contexts do not always
behave in the same ways. Understanding the differ-
ences requires a shift from events to processes and
pathways, for example, from births to becoming a
parent (Hobcraft 2007). Differences are often
related to unobserved characteristics. Accounting
for the distribution of unobserved factors in a popu-
lation improves the explanation and prediction, even
without knowing precisely what the unobserved
factors are. Causal mechanisms consist of processes
of decision-making as well as processes turning
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decisions into action and behaviour. Explanation by
association, on the other hand, disregards these
causal mechanisms that produce observed outcomes.
The consequences of micro-level actions and be-
haviour for population change depend on diffusion
processes. New behaviour adopted initially by some
may later be adopted by many. Transmission and dif-
fusion require communication, and the easier the
communication is, the more rapid the diffusion.
That explains the significance of proximity and infor-
mation technology for diffusion processes. Hence, in
general, a mechanism-based theory of population
change rests on two pillars: a theory of action and a
theory of social diffusion.
The focus of this Supplement is on decision pro-
cesses and the actions that follow from decisions. In
some of the papers, diffusion processes are also dis-
cussed, but not as extensively as, for instance, by Cas-
terline (2001). To introduce the papers, we first
picture what is known about the processes that
result in demographically relevant choices, also
referred to as life cycle choices. Next, we discuss
the operationalization of that knowledge in ABMs:
a class of simulation models in which population
change is viewed as an outcome of actions and inter-
actions at the micro level. In the third main section,
we introduce the papers and highlight their contri-
butions. In the final section, we reflect briefly on
the likely impact of the study of decision processes
and agent-based modelling on the discipline of
demography.
Choice processes and demographic
behaviour: what do we know?
The decision-making process
A decision-making process is the mechanism that
links a decision to its determinants and intervening
factors that facilitate or constrain the process and
its outcome. Reaching a decision is often difficult
and takes time. The complexity and duration of the
decision process both vary with the nature of the
choice to be made. Simple heuristics are usually suf-
ficient for routine choices. Life choices, on the other
hand, take time as they involve more deliberation
and consultation, because the stakes and the uncer-
tainty are high (Kahneman 2011). During that time,
conditions may change, new information may
become available, or events may occur that affect
goals, preferences, and available resources, and thus
the decision itself. Frequently, time is too short to
collect all the necessary information to determine
the set of options and to weigh them accurately.
Deadlines may be self-imposed, imposed by other
individuals, or by society, for example, age norms
(Liefbroer and Billari 2010; Van Bavel and Nitsche
2013). A consequence is that individuals are forced
to select an option based on incomplete information,
knowing that a better option might have been
selected, given more time. In a recent review of
how married couples choose between divorce and
reconciliation, Allen and Hawkins (2017) note that
the decision to divorce is often constrained by time
and influenced by other transitions in the life
course, such as securing a stable job or children
leaving home, which can be seen as competing risks
to the divorce decision.
The notions of choice and decision are often used
interchangeably, but it is better to distinguish
between the concepts. A decision is a mental
process, while choice is the outcome of that process.
Decision theory is the study of how choices are
made (positive or descriptive theory) or should be
made (normative or prescriptive theory) to achieve
a goal. A choice is usually, but not always, followed
by an action. An action is the implementation of a
choice. The use of the concepts ‘decision’, ‘choice’,
and ‘action’ differ by discipline. Economists refer to
decision theory and choice theory, and do not dis-
tinguish between decision/choice and action (e.g.,
Hess and Daly 2014). In social psychology, decision
theory is known as theory of action (e.g., Heckhausen
1991; Fishbein and Ajzen 2010; Heckhausen and
Heckhausen 2010). Heckhausen (1991) does dis-
tinguish between decision and action. In his theory,
a decision implies a commitment to engage in an
action, but even then, the action does not follow
automatically. By making a decision, the individual
crosses the Rubicon, that is, a point of no return or
a tipping point. That distinction is useful, and it is
central in Kley’s study of the migration decision (in
this Supplement).
The Rubicon model, a multistage model of
action, originated in developmental psychology
(Heckhausen 1991). It starts from the view that indi-
viduals pursue developmental goals to produce the
life course they want. Developmental goals are
anticipated end states; they motivate an individual
to act in a particular way. The process of action con-
sists of several stages. It begins with the awakening of
a wish to achieve a goal and ends after the goal has
been accomplished. The initial Rubicon model
(Heckhausen 1991) distinguishes four stages: the
pre-decisional stage (phase); the post-decisional but
pre-actional stage; the actional stage; and the post-
actional stage. The stages are separated by clear
S2 Frans Willekens et al.
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boundaries or transition points (hence the reference
to Rubicon): the making of a decision; the initiation
of actions; and the conclusion of actions.
More recently,HeinzHeckhausen and his daughter
Jutta extended the Rubicon model to a theory of
motivation that covers the entire life course, by intro-
ducing the time it takes to make a decision or to plan
and prepare an action. That time is constrained by
developmental deadlines in the life course. The dead-
lines are determined biologically (e.g., menopause),
socially (e.g., age norms), or legally (e.g., duration of
pregnancy at abortion). These deadlines introduce a
sense of urgency and may result in suboptimal
decisions (Heckhausen et al. 2010).
Properties of decision processes
Models are cognitive aids for comprehending
complex processes. The decision processes covered
in this Supplement have four basic properties. First,
the outcome of a decision process is a choice
between a finite number of alternatives, called pro-
spects by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). This type
of choice is usually referred to as a discrete choice
because the variable that represents the alternatives
(choice set) is a discrete variable. Second, each
alternative carries considerable risk. The uncertain-
ties complicate the decision. Utilities or benefits of
each alternative cannot be anticipated with certainty,
preferences are not stable, conditions may change,
and unexpected events may occur. As a consequence,
the outcome of the decision and the factors that influ-
ence the decision are usually modelled using random
variables.
Third, decision-making takes time, which is needed
to gather and process information and to deliberate
about the relative merit of each alternative. This sub-
stantive interpretation of the duration of decision-
making is supported in psychology, cognitive
science, and neuroscience (Hawkins et al. 2013; Stan-
dage et al. 2015). The amount of time an individual
takes depends on their cognitive interests and capa-
bilities, and their experiences with similar decisions.
The consequence is a great diversity of decision
styles, decision rules (heuristics), and decision dur-
ations. The time needed to determine the merit of
an alternative also varies with the alternative itself.
If time only permits the collection of sufficient infor-
mation (evidence) about a subgroup of alternatives,
the individual is likely to favour these alternatives
over other alternatives with incomplete information
(Usher et al. 2013). Therefore, a choice is a trade-
off between speed and accuracy.
These first three properties may be incorporated
into the decision-making model by representing the
discrete choice problem as a stochastic race, called
a ‘horse race’ in random utility discrete choice
models (Busemeyer and Rieskamp 2014). The
horse race model and its extension, the speed–accu-
racy trade-off model (dating back at least to the pio-
neering work of Hale 1969), allow the diversity of
decision rules and durations to be captured.
From a demographic standpoint, the stochastic
race model is essentially a competing risks model
(Marley and Colonius 1992; Colonius and Marley
2015). That important observation has not yet
received much attention in the literature, although
Marley and Colonius in psychology and Pudney
(1989) in economics refer explicitly to the competing
risks model.
The fourth, related, property of the decision
process is distinct stages. Each stage integrates the
achievements of earlier stages. The duration of
each stage determines the total decision time. Kla-
bunde et al. and Warnke et al. (both in this Sup-
plement) implement the stochastic race model and
distinguish several stages of the decision process.
Deliberation
Alternatives may vary in time and space. A first step
in any deliberation is to find out what the options are,
that is, to determine the choice set. Options that are
theoretically possible may not be feasible in a par-
ticular cultural or political context. For instance, in
some societies, partner search is highly regulated
because partnerships and marriage affect the social
status of the family and may involve a substantial
intergenerational transfer of property. While not pro-
hibiting them, society may discourage alternatives.
For instance, in most parts of the world hypogamy
(marrying down, i.e., marrying a person of a lower
social status) is discouraged for women, although
the social pressure is weakening. In this Supplement,
Grow et al. investigate why this pressure is subsiding.
The options an individual can choose from change
continuously as a result of sociocultural change,
economic change, political change, technological
change, or a combination of these. Changes in
choice sets are major drivers of social and demo-
graphic change. For instance, the decision to post-
pone childbirth (e.g., because of career aspirations)
has been made possible by advancements in repro-
ductive technology and assisted reproduction. Simi-
larly, globalization and the advancement of
information and communication technology (such
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as the Internet) have increased the options dramati-
cally for people considering emigration in search of
education, employment, or adventure, or for family
reasons.
Deliberation is often a collaborative activity and
results in shared decision-making. Shared decision-
making has been studied extensively in the contexts
of households (see, e.g., Becker 1991; Ermisch
2003), migration (see, e.g., Stark and Bloom 1985
and the ‘new economics of migration’ literature),
and healthcare (see, e.g., Lippa et al. 2017). Partners
in collaborative deliberation are not necessarily
equal. Their bargaining power in the decision
process and their impact on the choices made
usually depend on available resources, including
income, information, wealth, and cognitive capabili-
ties. The influence may vary between the stages of
the decision process. Partners may not enter stages
of the decision process at the same points in time,
causing frictions and complicating shared decision-
making. Haley et al. (2002) provide an excellent dis-
cussion of the issues of joint decision-making
involved in end-of-life decisions, involving various
aspects of care arrangements, such as palliative,
medical, or hospice care. Authors who study difficult
and complex end-of-life decisions stress the need to
distinguish personal perspectives on the transition,
decision styles, and decision heuristics, and to
educate those involved to make a truly shared
decision (see, e.g., Barry and Edgman-Levitan 2012;
Mathew et al. 2016).
Stages of decision-making
From the point of view of modelling, it is convenient
to regard the decision process as a process with mul-
tiple stages. In what follows, we present a brief review
of models of individual decision-making and action,
in which processes are divided into stages. Janis and
Mann (1977) were the first to distinguish stages in
the decision process. They consider five stages: (1)
appraising the challenge; (2) surveying alternatives;
(3) weighing alternatives; (4) deliberating about
commitments; and (5) adhering to the choice made,
despite negative feedback. Haberkorn (1981)
applied these stages to study the migration decision.
The five stages are often considered in models of
choice, for example, in discrete choice models (see,
e.g., Hess and Daly 2014).
The prospect theory of decision-making under
uncertainty distinguishes two stages in the choice
process: an early phase of editing and a subsequent
phase of evaluation (Kahneman and Tversky 1979,
p. 274). During the editing phase, information is col-
lected and a preliminary analysis of alternatives is
performed, which determines how prospects are per-
ceived. The authors claim that people perceive
options as gains or losses. That framing of outcomes
has a significant effect on the decision process and
the choice made. During the evaluation phase, the
value of each edited prospect is assessed using a
valuation rule and a prospect is chosen accordingly.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 299) refer to the
two stages of the choice process as ‘framing’ and
‘valuation’. The authors concentrate on cognitive
biases during the editing (framing) and evaluation
(valuation) stages that are not accounted for in the
expected utility theory, the dominant theory of
choice in economics (for a brief recent discussion of
the expected utility theory, see, e.g., Moscati 2016).
Another theory of action that distinguishes stages
in the process leading to action is the transtheoretical
model (TTM) of action (Prochaska et al. 1992). This
perspective, which was originally developed to
understand and predict health behaviour, is called
‘transtheoretical’ because it integrates principles
from different leading theories. In the TTM, inten-
tions to act unfold over time and involve progress
through six stages of change: (1) precontemplation
(no action is intended); (2) contemplation (consider-
ing a change in the next period); (3) preparation for
action; (4) action (making a change); (5) mainten-
ance (sustaining the change over time); and (6) ter-
mination. A main reason for staying in the first
stage is a lack of awareness of the consequences of
the action. In the maintenance stage, an individual
adjusts their life to accommodate the transition.
Some people may regret a transition or cannot
cope with the need to adjust. People who reach the
termination stage have adjusted and internalized
the transition. Tabor and Milfort (2011) applied the
TTM in a study of British migrants to New
Zealand. The decision process starts at a time when
the individual has not given any serious consider-
ation to moving abroad. The process ends with inte-
gration in the destination country. The authors found
that the decision process starts well before the
migrant leaves the country of origin and it continues
indefinitely thereafter. A similar approach is fol-
lowed by Grow et al. in this Supplement. Partner
search does not end with marriage, but continues
and may lead to divorce and repartnering.
McCall (1970) proposed a dynamic model of job
search involving learning. During the early stages
of job search, an individual learns their value on
the job market and adjusts their wage aspirations in
order to get a job. A job offer is only accepted if
S4 Frans Willekens et al.
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the wage exceeds a minimum threshold (reservation
wage). The rejection of job offers comes at a cost
because of foregone earnings. The cost increases
with the duration of the search. The reservation
wage is a measure of how attractive an individual
considers themself on the labour market. This attrac-
tiveness may initially be overestimated. Job search is
a learning process and time matters. Oppenheimer
(1988) discussed the similarity between job search
and partner search. Todd et al. (2005) used this
search model and found that individuals differ in
the time they need to gather information to deter-
mine their own value on the marriage market. Coha-
bitation is a means by which partners may gather
information.
The interest in how people make decisions led
some scholars to introduce time into established the-
ories of behaviour, extending the theories that
initially focused on decision outcomes to theories
that focus on multistage decision processes (process
theories). That has been the case with the Theory of
Planned Behaviour (TPB), which is widely used in
the behavioural and social sciences, and has a long
history in demography (Burch 1980). We briefly
describe the theory first and consider the extensions
next. The TPB (Ajzen 1991) originated in social psy-
chology as an extension of Fishbein’s theory of
reasoned action (TRA) (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010).
According to the TPB, intentions predict behaviour
—to some extent. Individuals form intentions on
the basis of personal beliefs about: (a) relative
benefits of a given action (behavioural beliefs/atti-
tudes); (b) social expectations (normative beliefs/
social norms); and (c) their own ability to choose
and act independently (agency), to mobilize
resources, and to remove or conquer barriers
(control beliefs/perceived behavioural control). The
last element is inspired by Bandura’s (1977)
concept of self-efficacy, which is one’s belief in the
ability to accomplish a task.
Intentions predict behaviour, but the predictive
power may be weak because the actual ability to
accomplish a task may differ significantly from
one’s belief (actual behavioural control). For more
detail on the TPB, the reader is referred to the
paper by Klabunde et al. (in this Supplement).
Recently, the theory inspired the conceptual frame-
work of reproductive decision-making adopted in
the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) (Lief-
broer 2011; Philipov et al. 2015). Klobas and Ajzen
(2015) applied the theory to gain insight into the
decision to have a child. The theory has also been
applied to migration (for a review of studies, see Kla-
bunde and Willekens 2016).
Courneya and Bobick (2000) extended the TPB to a
decision process theory by integrating the TPB and the
TTM.ArmitageandArden(2002)used theTPBfordis-
criminating between the stages of the TTM. Klabunde
et al. (this Supplement) also extend the TPB, by dis-
tinguishing four stages in the mental process preceding
emigration (see also Willekens 2017).
Although conditions that trigger transitions
between stages of a decision process have been
studied extensively, the conditions that determine
the onset of a decision process have been explored
less. What causes people to consider or develop a
positive attitude towards a life choice, such as mar-
riage, divorce, or migration? It may be an event,
the accumulation of experiences (e.g., dissatisfaction
with current conditions), signals received from sig-
nificant others (social network), or the context
more generally. These factors influence all steps of
the decision process, but they are particularly signifi-
cant as initiators of the process.
Social context
Finally—and crucially in the context of agent-based
modelling, as discussed in detail in the next section
—the autonomy of an individual to make choices
(agency) and the options available depend on the
social context. Through social pressure and social
sanctions, the social (plus cultural and political)
context assures that individual behaviour stays
within acceptable boundaries. For example, a
person’s religion may not allow divorce, same-sex
marriage, or modern family planning, or their gov-
ernment may make abortion or euthanasia illegal.
Such regulations seriously discourage people from
even considering these life choices. Secularization
was instrumental in the diffusion of modern family
planning and fertility decline in eighteenth-century
Europe (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). Past and
current state policies are highly relevant contextual
factors in individual choice (see, e.g., Presser et al.
2006 on birth control practices). Some authors have
abandoned asking people about motivations for the
choices they make and concentrate on the context
instead.
In a study of the mechanisms of Mexico–US
migration, Garip (2017) did not ask about migration
motivations, to avoid recall bias and post factum
interpretations, but obtained detailed accounts of
each person’s circumstances and events before
leaving. One event was the US Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965, which blocked avenues for
legal re-entry for the millions of Mexican temporary
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workers in the US who would normally return home
regularly for short stays. It resulted in a surge of
illegal migration and an increase in permanent settle-
ment in the US (Massey and Pren 2012). Immigration
policies often have unintended consequences
(Castles 2004; Czaika and de Haas 2013) because
individual choice mechanisms and human agency
are disregarded.
Decision processes in agent-based models
Classical demographic models, such as the life table
or the cohort-component projection model, do not
incorporate decision processes. The main parameter
of a demographic model is the rate at which demo-
graphic events occur (i.e., births, union formations,
separations, migrations, and deaths). That rate,
which is usually referred to as the hazard rate or tran-
sition rate, relates observed or estimated number of
demographic events during a given period to the dur-
ation of exposure during that period. The event count
during a given period, however, depends not only on
exposure time but also on the choices people make.
For instance, the number of union formations
during a given period is the number of couples that
completed the partner search process, found a
match, decided to form a union, and implemented
that choice in the action of union formation. Simi-
larly, the number of migrations during a period is
the number of people who made the decision to
migrate, completed the planning and preparation,
and left their place of residence. Relating counts of
events (process outcomes) during a given period to
exposure during that same period disregards the dur-
ation of decision processes, which may start long
before the period considered.
Since decision styles and decision processes differ
greatly between individuals, couples, and families,
models that incorporate decision processes are
often simulation models, sometimes referred to as
actor-based or agent-based models (ABMs). They
differ from the more common population-based
models in two respects. First, they model demo-
graphic events at the micro level and thus belong to
the family of micro-demographic models (Keyfitz
and Caswell 2005). Population characteristics are
obtained by aggregating the experiences of
members of that population. Second, they model
events as outcomes of decision processes, which natu-
rally take place under uncertainty and are influenced
by other actors in the population. Interactions
between actors underlie the diffusion processes of
values, opinions, and behavioural patterns in a
population. Decision and diffusion are micro-level
processes that generate the patterns and dynamics
observed at the population level.
Review studies have found that the majority of the
decision models incorporated in ABMs are not based
on an established decision theory but on a plethora of
independent ad hoc assumptions about how choices
are made (Huang et al. 2014; Klabunde and Wille-
kens 2016; Schlüter et al. 2017). Among the theories
used, the rational choice theory, which states that
people maximize their utility, is most prevalent. The
theory encompasses the Expected Utility Theory
(Moscati 2016) and the Discrete Choice Model
(Hess and Daly 2014), but also the Value Expectancy
Theory (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010), key elements of
which are incorporated into the TRA and TPB.
The initial version of the rational choice theory was
based on very restrictive assumptions. Extensions
have made the theory more realistic by accounting
for imperfect information, limited cognitive abilities
(affecting the amount of information that can be col-
lected during a given period), uncertainties, and
effects of previous decisions (inter-temporal choice).
More recently, the divide between choice theories
and models in economics, psychology, and cognitive
science has started to be bridged. The outcome is a
truly interdisciplinary ‘science of choice’. These devel-
opments are beginning to be introduced inABMs. The
inadequacies of choice theories in ABMs constitute a
serious weakness that needs to be overcome in order
to make agent-based modelling an effective instru-
ment for gaining insights into the causal mechanisms
driving demographic change. That is what motivated
the ‘Science of choice’ workshop in Rostock.
The papers
André Grow, Christine Schnor, and Jan Van Bavel
address partner choice and focus on the impact of
available alternatives on the outcome of the choice
process. Individuals tend to associate with others
who are similar; a phenomenon known as homophily.
Social background and cultural identity are important
attributes, but personality, interests, and world views
are relevant too. Homophily is usually explained
with reference to preferences. Recently, however,
Kets and Sandroni (2016) explained homophily as a
strategy for reducing uncertainty. Individuals face
less uncertainty when they interact with others who
are similar to them because it is easier to anticipate
reactions and to coordinate decisions and activities.
Homophily also explains assortative mating, which is
often observed in partner search and marriage.
S6 Frans Willekens et al.
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Homophily is only part of the story, however. For
people with limited economic resources, partnership
(and marriage in particular) is a strategy to achieve
upward mobility. Grow et al. note that both homo-
phily and upward mobility operate in the marriage
market. The attractiveness of a partner depends on
economic resources (earning potential) and similarity
in cultural resources (educational attainment).
In the past, women attached relatively more
importance to economic resources because their
earning potential was less than that of men due to
differences in educational attainment. They tended
to marry better educated men (hypergamy) and to
stay married. Over the past few decades, women’s
education has increased significantly and, since the
1990s, women have been surpassing men in terms
of participation and success in higher education. A
consequence of the reversal of the gender gap in edu-
cation is that, today, many women are better edu-
cated than men, and the attractiveness of a possible
partner is determined less by economic resources.
Another consequence is that marriages are less
stable because the attractiveness of the partner is
compared continuously with the attractiveness of
spousal alternatives. Grow et al. remind us that the
partner search does not end with marriage. The risk
of losing the spouse depends on two mechanisms
operating simultaneously: the emergence of opportu-
nities to start new relationships and the willingness to
make concessions to maintain the current relation-
ship. The authors present a search model that
extends beyond marriage, which is unique in the
demographic literature.
Stefanie Kley extends Heckhausen’s Rubicon
model, which distinguishes between decision and
action, and applies that model of action to internal
and international migration. When an individual
believes they cannot realize their goals in the
current place of residence, they may consider
migrating to another place. When opportunities
arise elsewhere, significant others support a
migration, and financial and other resources are suf-
ficient, the person may decide in favour of migration.
That decision implies a commitment by the individual
and most likely also by others. As a consequence, it is
‘costly’ to abandon the decision process after the
decision is made. Having previous migration experi-
ence facilitates the decision process: people with
migration experience are likely to need less time to
accumulate information on alternative destinations
and intervening factors, and thus may reach the
decision sooner.
In her contribution, Kley focuses on factors and
agents that facilitate or constrain the decision and
the action. The decision process is often triggered
by events in the life course or external events—politi-
cal or other. Personal achievements, such as edu-
cation or financial and other resources, facilitate
migration. Other factors, such as the presence of
school-age children and strong local ties, constrain
it. Particularly important during the planning stage
are facilitators at the destination, including social net-
works. Facilitators and constraints involve many
uncertainties, resulting in a high proportion of
people abandoning the decision process during the
pre-decisional stage and even during the planning
and preparation stages.
Anna Klabunde, Sabine Zinn, Frans Willekens,
and Matthias Leuchter focus on international
migration. They extend the TPB (Ajzen 1991; Fish-
bein and Ajzen 2010) to describe the process
leading to emigration, which consists of four stages.
A person in the first stage has never considered emi-
gration. The person leaves the stage when they
develop an interest in emigration or decide against
emigration. In the second stage, the person develops
behavioural beliefs, normative beliefs, and control
beliefs, which ultimately result in an intention to emi-
grate or the decision to abandon the intention and
stay. A person who has developed an intention to
emigrate moves to the next stage and starts planning
and preparing to leave the country. The preparation
stage ends with the emigration. During the planning
and preparation stages, the person needs to mobilize
resources, to overcome barriers, and to take advan-
tage of opportunities that may arise. Planning and
preparation will be successful if the person is
capable of dealing adequately with control factors.
If the actual behavioural control is deficient, the
person may decide or be forced to stay. Many
people consider emigration but few leave their
country, because the expected benefits do not
exceed the expected costs, or the constraints that
emerge during the decision process hinder them.
The development and realization of intentions are
embedded in the life course. Transitions in the life
course may occur, for example, marriage, childbirth,
or a change in activity status, and these may affect the
emigration process at any stage. Individuals are also
influenced by the opinions and support of members
of their social network and by social norms. External
events, such as increased border control and other
policy changes in destination countries, may occur
too. Transitions in the life course, social norms,
social support, and external shocks are subject to
uncertainties. These are incorporated by specifying
a stochastic process model, more specifically a
Markov process model.
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A distinguishing feature of the model presented by
Klabunde et al. is that most transitions in the life
course are determined by transition rates, but
migration is determined by behavioural processes
and associated behavioural rules. Migration and
other life events are competing risks; whether
migration or another life event occurs is the
outcome of a stochastic race. The transition rates,
which are the parameters of the process model, are
estimated from data, except for emigration. Emigra-
tions are based on behavioural rules and rules gov-
erning the interactions between individuals.
Individuals may leave the behavioural process at
any stage. More people abandon the process in the
early stages than in later stages, consistent with the
theory. The model is calibrated using data from the
Migrations between Africa and Europe (MAFE)
survey.
The computational implementation of complex
ABMs, such as the model described by Klabunde
et al., can be troublesome. Specialized computer
languages, if available, facilitate the implementation
of ABMs. Tom Warnke, Oliver Reinhardt, Anna
Klabunde, Frans Willekens, and Adelinde Uhrma-
cher present a new programming language that facili-
tates the implementation of agent-based stochastic
models in demography. The language, called the
Modelling Language for Linked Lives (ML3),
allows for a compact description of life histories
that involve complex decisions, interaction between
individuals, and other behavioural processes. The
language is domain-specific, which means that it is
designed specifically for demography and uses the
demographer’s language. ML3 is inspired by the
success stories of domain-specific languages in
biology and other fields.
In ML3, a population is composed of individuals
and institutions. An institution can be a cluster of
individuals, such as a household, or a local or national
authority or civil organization. Multiple levels of
analysis are distinguished. Individuals and insti-
tutions, which in the ABM are both referred to as
agents, have attributes that change during the life
course following transition rates or behavioural
rules. If decision-making and the planning and prep-
aration of the action take longer than the waiting
time to a rate-based competing transition, then the
behavioural process is interrupted and the competing
transition occurs. This is consistent with the theory of
competing risks. Agents interact with other agents
and develop links (ties) and social networks. Ties
may be institutionalized, leading to new agents.
ML3 is applied to the migration model presented
by Klabunde et al. (this Supplement).
The integration of behavioural theories into demo-
graphic models through agent-based modelling is a
nascent field. In the final paper, Jonathan Gray,
Jason Hilton, and Jakub Bijak give directions. A criti-
cal issue is the choice between alternative theories
from economics (including behavioural economics),
sociology, psychology, cognitive science, and other
fields. In order to enhance insights into demographic
behaviour, the theory and any model that is based on
the theory should meet several requirements.
First, the theory should situate individual behav-
iour in a context and the model should operationalize
the context. There seems to be general consensus
that the social context should be operationalized as
a social network of individuals and institutions. The
structure of the network matters, but also what
flows over the network structure. Agents in a
network exchange information and exercise influ-
ence. They may also exchange resources and
provide support. An individual has some freedom
to choose the social network but they are also
moulded by the network. For instance, an individ-
ual’s preferences are likely to be similar to the prefer-
ences of other members of the social network,
because they are influenced by the same network.
In ABMs, that is operationalized by deriving an indi-
vidual’s preference from information reported by
other members of the network (e.g., desired income
from reported income levels). The flow of infor-
mation and other items in a network is not a
passive process, but is actively influenced by
members of the network. That may result in shared
belief systems that may differ substantially from the
belief systems in other social networks, leading to
polarization. Such a mechanism can be accommo-
dated relatively easily in ABMs.
A second requirement is that the theory and model
should emphasize the process character of decision-
making and actions, as illustrated in the papers by
Kley, Klabunde et al., and Warnke et al. (all in this
Supplement). By implication, time matters (see
Abbott 2001). Time enters the ABM in at least two
ways. First, time locates decisions and actions in a
time-varying context. Age (individual time) situates
decisions and actions in the life course, and calendar
time locates decisions and actions in their historical
contexts. Second, if an individual prefers to receive
something now rather than later, a time preference
exists and discounting is appropriate.
A third requirement is that the theories and
models account for the various uncertainties. Gray,
Hilton et al. (this Supplement) distinguish between
epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge) and alea-
tory uncertainty (inherent randomness). Epistemic
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uncertainty can be reduced by learning. Aleatory
uncertainty cannot be reduced, but its effects can
be mitigated by risk diversification and risk sharing.
Finally, a fourth suggested requirement is that behav-
ioural theories and models acknowledge heterogen-
eity: individuals differ in how they make decisions
and how they plan and prepare actions. They differ
in the way they frame situations and interpret mess-
ages, actions, and events.
The way forward
No single theory or model is likely to satisfy all
requirements. Therefore, the way forward suggested
by Gray, Hilton et al. (this Supplement) is to: (a) con-
sider different theories and models (multimodel
approach); (b) adopt a modular approach to model-
ling, which means developing building blocks (includ-
ing computer code) that can be reused later and by
other researchers; and (c) replace critical hypotheses
and assumptions with empirical evidence on decision
processes and behaviouralmechanisms, including evi-
dence produced by experiments. Ideally, model
design guides data collection and better data lead to
better models with fewer assumptions. This makes
agent-based modelling an iterative process.
Decision and diffusion are micro-level processes
that generate the patterns and dynamics observed at
the population level. The extent to which behaviour
at the micro level causes changes at the population
level depends on the transmission of preferences, atti-
tudes, and resources to other agents in the population,
that is, on diffusion processes. Agent-based modelling
is the proper strategy for combining decisions and dif-
fusions. ABMs may combine conventional demo-
graphic rates with theory-based decision rules,
behavioural (action) rules, and rules of social inter-
action and transmission, as illustrated in the models
presented by Klabunde et al. (this Supplement) and
Prskawetz (2017, p. 61). The adoption of ABMs that
combine evidence-based rates of transition with
theory- and evidence-based rules of transition would
bridge the divide that exists between social demogra-
phy and formal demography. In this way, agent-based
modelling could unite social and formal demography,
as originally proposed by Burch (2003).
Similar suggestions have been made in the decision
literature. Ben-Akiva et al. (2012) advocated an exten-
sionofdiscrete choice theory toa theoryonhowpeople
make decisions, including the introduction of insights
from psychology and sociology into economic theories
of choice. Individual beliefs play an important role in
theories and models of decision-making and action.
They are central in the Expected Utility Theory and
the TPB. Beliefs form the cognitive structures or
mental models that enable people to interpret events,
actions, and situations, and that help to shape their
values and preferences. The operationalization of
beliefs, the combination of beliefs and empirical evi-
dence, and the revision of beliefs in light of new infor-
mation raise important issues in the modelling of
decision-making and action. These issues can be
addressed effectively by adopting a Bayesian perspec-
tive,which is not only basedon the subjective interpret-
ation of probability as a measure of belief, but also has
explicit links to statistical decision theory (DeGroot
1969/2004; Robert 2007; Arló-Costa et al. 2017).
In the 1970s, Ajzen and Fishbein (1975) discussed
Bayesian information processing and the use of
Bayes’s theorem to update beliefs in the light of
new information. They never incorporated the Baye-
sian information processing model in the TRA or the
TPB. They concluded, however, that Bayes’s
theorem could serve as a unified and integrated fra-
mework for the study of human behaviour. For
many years, the paper received little attention, but
that has now changed. The Bayesian perspective on
how people reason, learn, and make choices is
gaining importance in cognitive science, in particular
since scholars identified the similarity between
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (e.g.,
Piaget 1966) and Bayesian learning. Piaget distin-
guished between assimilation (where new infor-
mation is incorporated into the existing mental
model) and accommodation (where the existing
mental model is revised in light of new information)
(see, e.g., Miller 2016). That similarity stimulated the
interest in Bayesian reasoning and learning (see, e.g.,
Perfors 2016; Tourmen 2016). Bayesian reasoning is
the use of subjective probabilities to represent
degrees of belief and the manipulation of these prob-
abilities in accordance with rules of probability
theory. The graphical representation of relationships
between characteristics of interest is referred to as a
Bayesian or belief network. In demographic agent-
based modelling, a recent foray into this area com-
pared the use of Bayesian decision theory with
several alternative options (Gray, Bijak, et al. 2017).
Bayesian reasoning, Bayesian networks, and their
extension, decision networks, offer a unified approach
to the study of choices people make (Jern and Kemp
2015). These developments give rise to Bayesian cog-
nitive science andBayesian decision science (see, e.g.,
Colombo and Hartmann 2015 for a recent review).
Even if human reasoning does not necessarily follow
the Bayesian blueprint in many real-life settings
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996), the Bayesian
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perspective can still provide a coherent language to
address different aspects of the complex and uncer-
tain demographic reality, and offer a way of integrat-
ing individual-level behavioural insights with a
statistical analysis of population-level phenomena.
Following Bijak and Bryant (2016), we therefore
believe that demography canbenefit greatly by adopt-
ing a Bayesian perspective on the processes and
causal mechanisms underlying demographic change.
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